What Games? Why Equilibria? Which Equilibria?

Piotr Swistak
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Piotr Swistak: University of Maryland at College Park

Rationality and Society, 1992, vol. 4, issue 1, 103-116

Abstract: This article focuses on selected claims made by three authors about game theory: “What games?†(Aaron Wildavsky), “Why equilibria?†(Gordon Tullock), and “Which equilibria?†(Michael Hechter). The intention is to bring some balance to the debate by pointing to the fact that most of the arguments discussed are conditional; they are true under some assumptions but false under others. The power of game theory stems from the fact that it enables us to seek solutions no matter what assumptions we believe to be true about the modeled phenomenon.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:103-116

DOI: 10.1177/1043463192004001012

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