The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems

Michael Hechter
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Michael Hechter: University of Arizona

Rationality and Society, 1992, vol. 4, issue 1, 33-40

Abstract: Game-theoretical analyses of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) supergame aim to deduce the existence of wholly endogenous solutions to collective action problems. So far, however, game theory has been unable to identify a unique equilibrium solution to the PD supergame. This lack of success, together with the assumption of complete and perfect information, suggests that these purely deductive searches for endogenous solutions are insufficient for understanding collective action problems in the real world. To be of use in the social sciences, applied game theory must be oriented toward specifying the links between its abstract categories and actual social structures.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:33-40

DOI: 10.1177/1043463192004001005

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