An Economic Argument for Affirmative Action

Dean P. Foster and Rakesh V. Vohra
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Dean P. Foster: University of Chicago
Rakesh V. Vohra: University of Chicago

Rationality and Society, 1992, vol. 4, issue 2, 176-188

Abstract: This article presents a model involving employers and two classes of workers, alike except for labels. Employers choose whom to hire and workers choose whether to invest in training. At one equilibrium, employers discriminate, which, the authors show, is Pareto inferior to another equilibrium where no discrimination occurs. On the basis of this observation, an argument for affirmative action is advanced .

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:4:y:1992:i:2:p:176-188

DOI: 10.1177/1043463192004002004

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