Rational Choice and the Limits of Theoretical Generality

James B. Rule
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James B. Rule: State University of New York at Stony Brook

Rationality and Society, 1992, vol. 4, issue 4, 451-469

Abstract: Claims that rational choice analysis represents a general theory of social processes raise questions not only about rational choice but about the very idea of theoretical generality. Logically, a truly general theory ought to offer analytical means to all legitimate ends of social inquiry. This article holds, however, that no theory based on any single genre of social processes (rational calculation included) can serve the full range of descriptive or explanatory purposes properly addressed by sociologists. Rational choice thinking, like other claimants to the status of theoretical generality, misleads when its proponents doggedly insist on posing accounts invoking rational calculation to explain outcomes where other social processes are actually crucial. Acknowledgment of this fact can be expected to lead to the qualifications and amendments identified by Smelser as “theoretical degeneration .â€

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:4:y:1992:i:4:p:451-469

DOI: 10.1177/1043463192004004007

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