A Threshold Model of Electoral Policy and Voter Turnout
William Kaempfer () and
Anton D. Lowenberg
Additional contact information
Anton D. Lowenberg: California State University, Northridge
Rationality and Society, 1993, vol. 5, issue 1, 107-126
Voter turnouts differ significantly across societies, and in some polities voting is compulsory. To explain differences in voter turnout it is necessary first to explain the variation in compulsion policies that exists across societies. A threshold model of collective action is used to provide an explanation for compulsion policies, which are treated as endogenous. Governments and parties are viewed as â€œdemandingâ€ turnout as a means to enhance political support. This theory suggests that voter turnout is high, and possibly government mandated, in societies that have high levels of political polarization and that use proportional representation. The predictions of the theory are tested using cross-country data.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:107-126
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Rationality and Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().