Reason in Emotions or Emotions in Reason

Theodore D. Kemper
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Theodore D. Kemper: St. John's University

Rationality and Society, 1993, vol. 5, issue 2, 275-282

Abstract: The four articles on rationality and emotions are examined here from an emotions perspective. Economists Frank and Hirshleifer view emotions as often facilitating self-interested rational choice. From a Weberian social action perspective, rational choice is so thoroughly imbued with emotion that emotion plays more than a supporting role in the so-called rational determination of action. Sociologists Collins and Jasso concede at the outset the fundamental importance of emotion in rational action. Collins argues that emotion is the fundamental utility sought in all social action but appears, like many who have offered similar arguments, to risk tautology. Jasso locates emotion centrally in her theory of social comparisons and rational choice and thereby affords an opportunity to extend her examination of the emotions that can result from varying outcomes and comparisons.

Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:5:y:1993:i:2:p:275-282

DOI: 10.1177/1043463193005002007

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