Is Revolution Individually Rational?

Jack Goldstone

Rationality and Society, 1994, vol. 6, issue 1, 139-166

Abstract: An examination of the free rider problem in revolutionary action suggests that this problem can be, and historically has been, overcome by drawing on norms of solidarity developed in preexisting groups, which gain individuals' commitment by providing commonly needed public goods. A simple model of rational action by groups, based on considerations of individual solidarity and cross-group interactions, then predicts many of the well-known macrofeatures of revolutions in different kinds of societies.

Date: 1994
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:6:y:1994:i:1:p:139-166

DOI: 10.1177/1043463194006001008

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