Group Size and One-Shot Collective Action

Axel Franzen
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Axel Franzen: University of Berne

Rationality and Society, 1995, vol. 7, issue 2, 183-200

Abstract: Situations of collective actions have been modeled as iterated N- person Prisoner's Dilemma games or N- person Chicken games. Although there exists some experimental evidence with regard to the effects of group size in iterated dilemmas, very little attention has been given to one-shot social dilemmas. This article argues that some social dilemmas can be modeled as one-shot games. Furthermore, it discusses and provides experimental evidence on the effects of group size on cooperation in four different one-shot games. The results confirm the hypotheses that there are no group-size effects in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma and in the one-shot Chicken game. However, group size does have a negative effect on the cooperation rate in both the Volunteer's Dilemma and in the Assurance game.

Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:7:y:1995:i:2:p:183-200

DOI: 10.1177/1043463195007002006

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