COGNITION IN SEEMINGLY RISKLESS CHOICES AND JUDGMENTS

Louis Lévy-Garboua and Claude Montmarquette
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Louis Lévy-Garboua

Rationality and Society, 1996, vol. 8, issue 2, 167-185

Abstract: The assumption of given and known preferences and possibilities so common in economic theory stands in contradiction with the kind of unsystematic changes that characterize many experimental and real situations. Consequently, the theory misspecifies rational choice and generates many puzzles relating to marginal analysis, sunk costs, judgments of fairness, the endowment effect, etc. We model rational cognition and learning in `seemingly riskless' choices and judgments. Preferences and possibilities are given in a stochastic sense and based on revisable expectations. The theory predicts experimental preference reversals and passes a sharp econometric test on the status quo bias drawn from a field study.

Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Cognition in Seemingly Riskless Choices and Judgments (1996)
Working Paper: Cognition in Seemingly Riskless Choices and Judgments (1996)
Working Paper: Cognition in Seemingly Riskless Choices and Judgments (1996)
Working Paper: Cognition in Seemingly Riskless Choices and Judgments (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:8:y:1996:i:2:p:167-185

DOI: 10.1177/104346396008002003

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