RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE TSL MODEL OF OCCUPATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

John Allen Logan

Rationality and Society, 1996, vol. 8, issue 2, 207-230

Abstract: Logan (1996b) proposes a two-sided logit (TSL) model for estimating the preferences of workers and employers which determine employment matches in labor markets. Analysis of this model shows that TSL allows empirical estimation of the contribution of both instrumental and immanent values in occupational opportunity, preserving the threefold structure of rational choice described by Hechter (1994). It is also shown that the TSL model is related to a recognized two-sided matching game, and that implicit assumptions of complete information and of stability of all observed matches (at current levels of supply and demand) are fundamental to the TSL estimation method.

Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:8:y:1996:i:2:p:207-230

DOI: 10.1177/104346396008002005

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