Private Tutoring, School Education and Government Policy

Bibhas Saha and Subhra Baran Saha
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Subhra Baran Saha: Subhra Baran Saha is at the Department of Economics, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio, OH 44115, U.S.A.; E-mail: s.b.saha@csuohio.edu

Review of Market Integration, 2009, vol. 1, issue 3, 375-408

Abstract: We develop a model of private tutoring where its demand emerges from poor schooling infrastructure and shirking by teachers. We analyse the government’s policy choice and society’s educational outcome. If the teacher is to be made more dutiful, his salary must be raised sufficiently, which means that very little money is left for infrastructure. In contrast, if the overall education is to be improved, better infrastructure is needed; but then the teachers’ salary has to be reduced and private tutoring may partly substitute class room teaching. The households may prefer the latter. This gives rise to a policy dilemma.

Keywords: Public education; private tutoring; shirking; school infrastructure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:revmar:v:1:y:2009:i:3:p:375-408

DOI: 10.1177/097492921000100305

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