An Evolutionary Game Model of Collaborative Innovation Between Enterprises and Colleges Under Government Participation of China

Nina Su, Zhuqin Shi, Xianqi Zhu and Yunsheng Xin

SAGE Open, 2021, vol. 11, issue 1, 2158244021994854

Abstract: The three-party evolutionary game model of government, enterprises, and institutions of higher learning is established, and the dynamic evolution process of collaborative innovation behavior is discussed under the two strategies of “incentive†and “non-incentive†chosen by the government. The results show that under the premise of stronger innovation consciousness of the government and institutions and smaller the innovation cost of enterprises, the system is easier to reach the ideal state. The incentive degree of government should be controlled within a reasonable range to prevent enterprises from falling into a bad state because of the temptation of economic interests.

Keywords: government encouragement; collaborative innovation; evolutionary game; enterprise cooperation; policy decision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:sagope:v:11:y:2021:i:1:p:2158244021994854

DOI: 10.1177/2158244021994854

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