Abusing Good Intentions

Tamas Bereczkei, Zsolt Peter Szabo and Andrea Czibor

SAGE Open, 2015, vol. 5, issue 2, 2158244015593119

Abstract: The present study aims to understand how Machiavellians switch from one kind of response to another in different circumstances to maximize their profit. We set up a specific experimental paradigm that involved both a cooperative and competitive version of a public goods game. We found that Machiavellianism accounts for the total amount of money paid by the players ( N = 144) across five rounds in the cooperative but not in the competitive game. Compared with the others, individuals with higher scores on Mach scale contributed less to the public goods in the cooperative condition, but no difference was found in the competitive condition. Finally, this relationship was influenced by the sequence of the games. These results indicate that Machiavellians skillfully evaluate social environments and strive to exploit those with abundant contributions to public goods.

Keywords: manipulation; public goods game; cooperation; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:sagope:v:5:y:2015:i:2:p:2158244015593119

DOI: 10.1177/2158244015593119

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