Should and Does Compulsory Voting Reduce Inequality?

Karel Kouba and Stanislav Mysicka

SAGE Open, 2019, vol. 9, issue 1, 2158244018817141

Abstract: The principal defense of compulsory voting suggests that it bridges socioeconomic inequalities by fostering a higher, and hence less socioeconomically biased, turnout. However, this article argues that this does not automatically translate into a less biased political voice because compulsory voting also generates socioeconomically biased invalid votes, which is demonstrated on the case of Ecuador. Normatively, we deny the existence of a general moral and legal duty to vote, which would justify compelling a citizen to vote. Achieving higher levels of social equality does not automatically take priority over a citizen’s rights to liberty and conscience. Furthermore, we object in general to the paternalistic justification of compulsory voting made by its defenders. Thus, we find that instituting compulsory voting as an instrument of reducing class inequalities is unwarranted both empirically and normatively.

Keywords: compulsory voting; voter turnout; invalid votes; inequality; electoral behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2158244018817141 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:sagope:v:9:y:2019:i:1:p:2158244018817141

DOI: 10.1177/2158244018817141

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in SAGE Open
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().