The Evolution of Partnerships

Ben Cooper and Chris Wallace
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Ben Cooper: Oxford University

Sociological Methods & Research, 2000, vol. 28, issue 3, 365-381

Abstract: In an evolutionary setting, players are allowed to choose not only their strategies for a particular game but also to some extent with whom they will play. This can lead to complex dynamics. Here, simulations are used to obtain some preliminary conclusions. It is shown that the ability to form fixed partnerships can enable players to coordinate on efficient outcomes. In scenarios where partnerships would lead to inefficient outcomes, they do not survive the evolutionary process.

Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:somere:v:28:y:2000:i:3:p:365-381

DOI: 10.1177/0049124100028003007

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