Tourism Supply-Chain Coordination: The Cooperation between Tourism Hotel and Tour Operator

Xiaolong Guo and Lina He

Tourism Economics, 2012, vol. 18, issue 6, 1361-1376

Abstract: This paper examines the cooperation problem that occurs when a tour operator cooperates with a tourism hotel with regard to two types of tour packages – luxury and economy. The authors first analyse the effects of basic utilities and prices on demand for the packages. They then build a sequential Stackelberg game model to study this cooperation in a decentralized scenario, and find that the tourism hotel acquires more revenue from the packages than the tour operator owing to its stronger bargaining power. Finally, a quantity-discount contract based on revenue sharing is designed to achieve full coordination in the cooperation, under which the total revenue from the packages is identical to that in a centralized scenario.

Keywords: tourism supply chain; supply-chain coordination; Stackelberg game; pricing strategy; hotel industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:toueco:v:18:y:2012:i:6:p:1361-1376

DOI: 10.5367/te.2012.0179

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