Agenda-setting as a trade union strategy: the case of the minimum wage in the Netherlands

Dirk Kloosterboer

Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 2024, vol. 30, issue 4, 471-486

Abstract: When political issues remain under the radar, politicians can lend their ears to lobbyists rather than the electorate, without being held accountable in elections. In such a situation, one potential strategy for trade unions and other organisations is to boost the visibility of these issues in the media, so that voters can take them into account when deciding who to vote for. This article proposes a method for exploring the feasibility of such a strategy. The minimum wage campaign conducted by the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation (FNV), which resulted in an 8–20 per cent increase in the minimum wage, is discussed as a case study. It is shown that the outcomes of the campaign are largely consistent with expectations based on the feasibility study conducted before it was launched. It is also argued that while other factors may have contributed to the outcome, they cannot explain the timing and nature of the political and media response.

Keywords: Minimum wage; agenda-setting; trade unions; The Netherlands (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:treure:v:30:y:2024:i:4:p:471-486

DOI: 10.1177/10242589241287902

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