On Resolving the Dilemma of Rent Control

Denton Marks
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Denton Marks: Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, 800 West Main Street, Whitewater, WI 53190-1790, USA

Urban Studies, 1991, vol. 28, issue 3, 415-431

Abstract: This research examines the motivations for adopting rent control and discusses a policy alternative designed to respond to the political appeal of rent control while minimising the investment distortion, capricious redistribution and administrative complexity of most controls. The policy involves limiting regulation to those rents paid by households in the tenant population that are deemed unable to afford adequate housing. All rental units in a jurisdiction register their rents with the relevant authority and are assigned a controlled rent. Landlords must charge the controlled rent only for eligible households but receive the difference between that rent and the market rent from the government. The analysis considers the design of such a policy, its behavioural incentives and some administrative implications. There is also consideration of the appeal of this policy relative to both conventional controls and policies more popular in the literature, such as a housing allowance.

Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:urbstu:v:28:y:1991:i:3:p:415-431

DOI: 10.1080/00420989120080431

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