Bargaining, Coalitions and Local Expenditure
Partha Gangopadhyay () and
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Shyam Nath: Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Mauritius, Reduit, Mauritius, email@example.com
Urban Studies, 2001, vol. 38, issue 13, 2379-2391
We extend the literature on local expenditure determination by showing that bargaining and grand coalition seem to facilitate collective decision-making in an assembly of elected councillors. We demonstrate that the solution of the game turns on the principle of equal relative concession. Based on limited experimentation, we assess the performance of local governments and find that group dominance frustrates local expenditure efficiency in urban localities of India.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:urbstu:v:38:y:2001:i:13:p:2379-2391
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