A Note on the Dynamic Analysis of Fiscal Competition

Toshiki Tamai

Urban Studies, 2008, vol. 45, issue 3, 651-657

Abstract: This note presents an analysis of dynamic aspects of fiscal competition in a model with local capital accumulation. This shows that, even when a head tax is available, the optimal capital tax rate is generally non-zero. In addition, a decentralised equilibrium without a head tax might be characterised by overprovision of local public goods in a dynamic fiscal competition model. The source of inefficiency is overaccumulation of local capital.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0042098007087339 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:urbstu:v:45:y:2008:i:3:p:651-657

DOI: 10.1177/0042098007087339

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Urban Studies from Urban Studies Journal Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().