Fiscal Effects of Reforming Local Constitutions

Lorenz Blume, Thomas Döring and Stefan Voigt

Urban Studies, 2011, vol. 48, issue 10, 2123-2140

Abstract: Most German states amended their local constitutions during the 1990s and now allow for the direct election of mayors, initiatives and referendums, and vote aggregation, as well as vote splitting. In this paper, it is asked whether these reforms had any effects on local fiscal policies. It is shown that the direct election of mayors led to lower government spending, whereas the introduction of direct democratic elements led to higher expenditures. The empirical results concerning direct democracy are substantially different from findings in relation to both Switzerland and the US. It is argued that this difference may be due to a lack of fiscal referendums in Germany.

Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:urbstu:v:48:y:2011:i:10:p:2123-2140

DOI: 10.1177/0042098010382676

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