Political Economy and Tenure of Coaches in Brazilian Soccer

Bruno Rocha, Fábio A. Miessi Sanches, Igor Viveiros Souza and José Carlos Domingos da Silva

Brazilian Review of Econometrics, 2009, vol. 29, issue 2

Abstract: In this paper we built a model of political economy to explain the tenure of coaches in Brazilian soccer. According to the model, a club’s board of directors maximizes its reputation by choosing the grade of the technical committee. Then, based on data from the Brazilian National Soccer League, we used coaching continuity as a proxy for the grade variable and duration analysis techniques to test the model’s propositions. According to the empirical analysis, and in line with the theoretical model, a coach’s performance is key to determining his continuity at a club. This model allows us to identify a parameter that gives, literally, the effect of the club’s performance upon the supporters’ perception about the board’s work. This parameter is an important determinant of the stability of a coach in charge of a soccer team.

Date: 2009
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