Discussion of "Bonus and Malus in Principal-Agent Relations with Fixed Pay and Real Effort"

Ulrike Stefani

Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), 2008, vol. 60, issue 3, 304-318

Keywords: Experiments; Fixed Wage; Moral Hazard; Principal-Agent Theory; Real Effort; Reward; Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D82 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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