Intra-Industry Effects of Shareholder Activism in Germany - Is there a Difference between Hedge Fund and Private Equity Investments?
Denis Schweizer and
Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), 2011, vol. 63, issue 2, 151-185
We investigate the valuation effects of industry rivals on german firms targeted by hedge funds and private equity investors. We argue that both types of investors differ from other blockholders due to their strong motivation and ability to actively engage and monitor. We find that the announcement of a change in ownership structure generates statistically significant short- and long-term intra-industry effects for rivals to the respective private equity and hedge fund targets. However, these effects differ markedly between hedge fund investments and private equity investments. We conclude that hedge funds are more aggressive than private equity investors in implementing a shareholder orientation.
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Hedge Fund; Information Signaling; Intra-Industry Effects; Private Equity; Rivals; Shareholder Activism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sbr:abstra:v:63:y:2011:i:2:p:151-185
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