Согласование экономических интересов города и поставщиков продукции на рынке государственного заказа

Соколова Светлана Владимировна
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Соколова Светлана Владимировна: СПбГУ

Vestnik of the St. Petersburg University. Series 5. Economics Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Серия 5. Экономика, 2003, issue 4 (29), 30-35

Abstract: Some theoretical and practical approaches to the state order's distributions arc considered in this article. While pointing to several shortcomings in the way this subject has been traditionally handled, the author proposes a fresh approach exploiting some new techniques from the theory of games. Matrix game can indicate how to settle the customers' and product suppliers' interests conflict. The customers' are interested in the highest possible economic effect owing to the lowest purchase prices; the product suppliers', on the other hand, are interested in maximizing profits by raising wholesale prices. The game theory method allows us to coordinate these contradicting interests, to ensure that transactions' are clear and fairpurity by the competitive proceedings' formalization, to restrict conniption and to expand the sphere of auction-based purchases.

Date: 2003
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