Дача хабара як кооперативна гра

Dotsenko S.
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Dotsenko S.: aras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Economics. Вісник Киiвського нацiонального унiверситету iм. Тараса Шевченка. Серiя: Економiка, 2012, issue 140, 30-31

Abstract: The officials bribing scheme is considered as cooperative game theory model. On the base of Shapley vector so called "truebribe values" are calculated. The numerical analysis explains why the bribes for business opening are so high and what is happen,if the bribes become legitimate, as G.Popov (famous russian economist, Moscow city mayor during perestroika) proposed once.

Keywords: КОАЛіЦіЯ; ВЕКТОР ШЕПЛі; СУПЕРМОДУЛЯРНіСТЬ; ЕФЕКТ СНіГОВОї КУЛі; КОАЛИЦИЯ; ВЕКТОР ШЕПЛИ; СУПЕРМОДУЛЯРНОСТЬ; ЭФФЕКТ СНЕЖНОГО КОМА (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:scn:013723:15577262

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