EVIDENCE ABOUT THE MORAL HAZARD IN THE ECUADORIAN HEALTH SYSTEM
Mercy Raquel Orellana Bravo (),
Juan Andrés Piedra Peña () and
Luis Santiago Sarmiento Moscoso ()
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Mercy Raquel Orellana Bravo: University of Cuenca; Research Group in Regional Economics
Juan Andrés Piedra Peña: University of Cuenca; Research Group in Regional Economics
Luis Santiago Sarmiento Moscoso: University of Cuenca; Research Group in Regional Economics
Journal of Smart Economic Growth, 2017, vol. 2, issue 1, 109-132
The aim of this study is to estimate the presence of moral hazard in the Ecuadorian health system, understood as an over-utilization of it. For this, a binomial logit model, which measures the probability of use of health services between insured and uninsured people is used. The results show evidence of moral hazard for individuals who are insured, mainly for adults over 60 years. In addition, it is noted that when having extra expenses that are not covered by insurance, insured people tend to reduce the use of medical services.
Keywords: Moral Hazard; asymmetric information; health insurance; health system; health services (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 I18 D82 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:seg:012016:v:1:y:2017:i:2:p:109-132
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