Remuneration models in outsourcing services

Arno Radermacher ()
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Arno Radermacher: Tomá?-Bat?a-University, Zlin

International Journal of Business and Management, 2015, vol. 3, issue 3, 40-57

Abstract: Remuneration models within the outsourcing business are almost used as accounting tools only. The lowest price is quite often the most relevant decision criterion. But the structures of these models have a significant regulating influence on the respective service. In the present paper different approaches to service billing and their impact on the services in outsourcing itself are considered. With the aid of approaches from principal-agent and transaction cost theories optimized remuneration models for different strategic objectives of the outsourcing company will be developed. In particular, the dependence of the optimal remuneration upon the cost structure of the service provider is proven.

Keywords: outsourcing; remuneration; salary; principal-agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sek:jijobm:v:3:y:2015:i:3:p:40-57

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