How Independent Are Belgian Regulators?

Frank Naert and Bart Defloor

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, 2009, vol. 10, issue 4, 355-385

Abstract: In this paper we attempt to analyse the independence of five Belgian regulatory agencies. In the theoretical part we cover the existing literature and find that independence is frequently used as a proxy for credibility. In the empirical part we use the framework constructed by Johannsen (2004) to measure the independence of Belgian regulatory agencies. In this framework four aspects of independence are identified and quantified leading to an overall independence index. Using legal analysis this framework is applied to the Belgian situation. We find that the independence of the Belgian financial regulator is very high, while the railway regulator is lacking most features of independence. The other regulators' score (the competition authority, the energy and telecommunications regulators) is somewhere in between. The overall picture is one of inconsistency.

Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sen:journl:v:10:i:4:y:2009:p:355-385

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