The Costs of Inappropriate Delegation: TRAI Act and Its Amendment

M.P. Tangirala

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, 2015, vol. 16, issue 1, 47-66

Abstract: Independent regulators are imagined as non-majoritarian institutions that are expected to function at arm’s-length from other branches of government so that decisions are made on the basis of expertise. The extent of their powers and the nature of their delegation crucially affect the performance of regulatory bodies since over- or under-delegation tends to increase social costs. This paper attempts to examine the evolution of regulatory governance in the Indian telecom sector by examining the statute governing TRAI and whether it has been successful in establishing a robust regulatory framework.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sen:journl:v:16:i:1:y:2015:p:47-66

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