EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Review of Applications of Game Theory to Global Climate Agreements

J. Eyckmans

Review of Business and Economic Literature, 2012, vol. 57, issue 2, 122-144

Abstract: This paper reviews game theoretic approaches to develop the formation of international environmental agreements in general and climate agreements in particular. We confront cooperative and non-cooperative approaches paying special attention to heterogeneous players and transfers. Recent extensions of the basic model with respect to uncertainty and dynamics are discussed. We conclude by listing priorities for further research in economics on international environmental policy coordination.

Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sen:rebelj:v:57:i:2:y:2012:p:122-144

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Business and Economic Literature is currently edited by Hans Kluwer

More articles in Review of Business and Economic Literature from Intersentia
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Petra Van den Bempt ().

 
Page updated 2019-06-19
Handle: RePEc:sen:rebelj:v:57:i:2:y:2012:p:122-144