An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts

Winand Emons

Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), 1993, vol. 129, issue IV, 625-642

Abstract: This paper begins with a survey of the classical legal theory of torts. Then we motivate and describe the economic approach to accident law. We demonstrate that negligence rules under which one party bears the entire accident costs induce an efficient pattern of behavior in a setup with identical individuals. Finally, we show that liability rules which share damages are superior to negligence rules once we leave the identical individuals framework.

Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ses:arsjes:1993-iv-3

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