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Die Zeitpräferenz der Zentralbank als strategische Handlungsalternative bei der Ausgestaltung von Geldpolitikmustern im Reputationsgleichgewicht

Volker Bieta

Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), 1995, vol. 131, issue II, 227-246

Abstract: In the present paper a Barro-Gordon model of monetary policy with asymmetric information is considered. Since monetary policy formation is an ongoing process with repeated interactions between the central bank and the private sector, game-theoretic methodology is the appropriate tool to analyse the problem of reputation as a repeated game. It is shown, that in a sequential equilibrium, which describes the policy actions, the time preference selection by the players has an important influence on the development of the real economy.

Date: 1995
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Handle: RePEc:ses:arsjes:1995-ii-4