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Why Are Trade Agreements More Attractive In The Presence Of Foreign Direct Investment?

Marcelo Olarreaga ()

Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), 1998, vol. 134, issue IV, 565-583

Abstract: This paper argues that interests of nationals (i.e., domestic residents) and owners of home-based foreign capital in the formation of a Trade Agreements (TA) are not antagonistic, except under rather particular assumptions on initial tariffs among potential members. Further, if initial tariffs are endogenously determined through an industrylobbying process, then TA that would have been immiserising in the absence of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), may be welfare-enhancing in the presence of foreign-owned firms. The rationale is linked to the effect that the entry of FDI has on the pre-TA tariff, through contributions to the incumbent government. These results may help explain recent integration programs between developed and developing countries.

Date: 1998
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Working Paper: Why are Trade Agreements More Attractive in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment? (1998)
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