Ansätze für eine effiziente Organisationsstruktur in der Schweizer Sozialversicherung: Lehren aus der ökonomischen Theorie der Clubs
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), 1999, vol. 135, issue III, 329-348
Based on the economic theory of clubs the paper develops criteria for an efficient organizational structure of social insurance. It is shown, how certain club interdependencies between members of a social insurance branch limit the scope for a competitive organizational structure. Nevertheless, it is pointed out, that competitive insurers can be superior to a single one in certain branches of social insurance. Social insurance branches that can (at least partially) be structured competitively are health insurance and pension insurance (AHV). On the other hand, the present regional division of financial responsibility in unemployment insurance seems to be problematic.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ses:arsjes:1999-iii-7
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