Decentralization and tax independence in OECD countries: GDP per capita analysis from 1995–2018

Anna Semmerling (), Andrzej Paczoski () and Giuseppe T. Cirella
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Anna Semmerling: WSB University
Andrzej Paczoski: Faculty of Economics, University of Gdansk

Journal of Banking and Financial Economics, 2022, vol. 1, issue 17, 42-59

Abstract: The association of local and regional self-government is examined in regard to the decentralization of state administration. This study extrapolated data from 36 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and analyzed whether decentralization of the state assists in economic growth and development. Administrative decentralization is explored through defi ning a precedence from the literature. A systematic literature review was conducted and macroeconomic OECD data using nominal gross domestic product was analyzed for the period of 1995–2018. The results confi rmed that decentralization does not positively correlate with the level of tax independence of local government and, in eff ect, is not an advantage. Territorial administration is highlighted throughout the paper as a key factor behind tax autonomy in relation to fi scal decentralization levels.

Keywords: state administration; self-government; public fi nance; tax autonomy; general government tax revenue; federal law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E7 F3 O1 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sgm:jbfeuw:v:1:y:2022:i:17:p:42-59

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