Bankers' bonuses in the management by objectives (MbO) system - principles and implementation. Restrictive measures within systemic risk management (Bankowe bonusy w systemie zarzadzania przez cele (MbO) - zalozenia a realizacja. Ograniczenia w ramach zarzadzania ryzykiem systemowym)

Rafal Plokarz ()
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Rafal Plokarz: Wyzsza Szkola Bankowa w Toruniu

Problemy Zarzadzania, 2012, vol. 10, issue 39, 92-111

Abstract: The essay outlines a new approach towards bankers’ bonuses in the light of the recent EU and Polish regulations. There was a lot of abuse in bank management remunerations last years in financial markets. New regulations should challenge negative phenomenon but at the same time they also bear some risks and leave some questions unanswered. The author analyses an example of one of the largest Polish banks, which implemented the system of bonuses within the Management by Objectives (MbO) system. Drawing from a long financier’s experience the author empirically shows the imperfection of the MbO application, but not undermining the overall efficiency of undertaken measures in the short and in the long run.

Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sgm:pzwzuw:v:10:i:39:y:2012:p:92-111

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