Matching with Restricted Preferences

Mustafa Kadir Doğan

Sosyoekonomi Journal, 2009, issue 2009-2

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of the introduction of restrictions on the statement of preferences in a two–sided matching model with incomplete information. The model is similar to the process used for college admissions in Turkey. Colleges have unanimous preferences – students with higher ranking in the national examinations are always preferred. We show that the introduction of the restrictions on statement of students' preferences can result in unstable matching between colleges and students.

Keywords: Stable Matching; College Admission System. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sos:sosjrn:090206

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