Parliamentary Coalitions, An n-person Game Approach to Politics

Ioannis E. Fountas (), Panagiotis K. Kampisioulis () and Stylianos Th. Drakatos ()
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Ioannis E. Fountas: University of Piraeus, Department of Informatics, Piraeus, Greece
Panagiotis K. Kampisioulis: University of Piraeus, Department of Informatics, Piraeus, Greece
Stylianos Th. Drakatos: University of Piraeus, Department of Informatics, Piraeus, Greece

SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, 2012, vol. 62, issue 3-4, 16-29

Abstract: In this paper, we present the general contribution of n-person game in turbulent environment of parliamentary coalitions. Same basic data about the coalition form and the characteristic function is necessary in order to connect n-person game theory and behavioral game theory. Taking the Norway elections as an example we study the possibility of a required long term coalition in Greece. We potentially suggest which parties could form a coalition by using game theory for those cases, where the choice of one party government is not possible.

Keywords: Game theory; N-person game; Characteristic function; Parliamentary coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spd:journl:v:62:y:2012:i:3-4:p:16-29

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