How to Distribute Costs Associated with a Delayed Project

Gustavo Bergantiños and E. Sánchez ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2002, vol. 109, issue 1, 159-174

Abstract: In this paper we study how to distribute the cost caused by the delay of a project among the firms which are responsible for it. We present two rules, one based on serial cost sharing problems and the other, in game theory. Moreover, we introduce some desirable properties, inspired by well-known principles, and study which of them are satisfied by the rules. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Keywords: serial cost sharing problems; TU games; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1016300218643

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