Modification of the Banzhaf Value for Games with a Coalition Structure
José Alonso-Meijide () and
M. Fiestras-Janeiro ()
Annals of Operations Research, 2002, vol. 109, issue 1, 213-227
In this paper we introduce a new coalitional value in the context of TU games with an a priori system of unions, which it is called the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value. This value satisfies the property of symmetry in the quotient game, the quotient game property, and it is a coalitional value of Banzhaf. Several characterizations are provided and two political examples illustrate the differences with respect to the Owen value and the Banzhaf–Owen value. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002
Keywords: a priori system of unions; coalitional Banzhaf values; voting games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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