Complementarity and Diagonal Dominance in Discounted Stochastic Games

Rabah Amir ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2002, vol. 114, issue 1, 39-56

Abstract: We consider discounted stochastic games characterized by monotonicity, supermodularity and diagonal dominance assumptions on the reward functions and the transition law. A thorough novel discussion of the scope and limitations of this class of games is provided. Existence of a Markov-stationary equilibrium for the infinite-horizon game, proved by Curtat (1996), is summarized. Uniqueness of Markov equilibrium and dominance solvability of the finite-horizon game are established. In both cases, the equilibrium strategies and the corresponding value functions are nondecreasing Liptschitz-continuous functions of the state vector. Some specific economic applications are discussed. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1021097716583

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