Nonparametric Adverse Selection Problems

G. Carlier ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2002, vol. 114, issue 1, 82 pages

Abstract: This article is devoted to adverse selection problems in which individual private information is a whole utility function and cannot be reduced to some finite-dimensional parameter. In this case, incentive-compatibility conditions can be conveniently expressed using some abstract convexity notions arising for instance in Mass Transfer Theory. After this characterization is provided, an existence result of optimal incentive-compatible contracts is proved. Finally, several economic examples are considered including applications to regulation and labor contracting. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Keywords: principal-agent problems; contract theory; abstract convex analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1021001917492

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