Market Power Issues in Bid-Based Hydrothermal Dispatch

Luiz Barroso (), Márcia Fampa (), Rafael Kelman (), Mario Pereira () and Priscila Lino ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2002, vol. 117, issue 1, 247-270

Abstract: The objective of this work is to investigate market power issues in bid-based hydrothermal scheduling. Initially, market power was simulated with a single stage Cournot–Nash equilibrium model. In this static model the equilibrium was calculated analytically. It was shown that the total production of N strategic agents is smaller than the least-cost solution by a factor of (N/(N+1)). Market power analysis for multiple stages was then carried through a stochastic dynamic programming scheme, where the decision in each stage and state is the Cournot–Nash equilibrium of a multi-agent game. Case studies with data taken from the Brazilian system are presented. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Keywords: hydrothermal scheduling; stochastic optimization; market power; game theory; Cournot–Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1021537910823

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