Optimal Equilibria in the Non-Cooperative Game Associated with Cost Spanning Tree Problems

Gustavo Bergantiños and Leticia Lorenzo

Annals of Operations Research, 2005, vol. 137, issue 1, 115 pages

Abstract: We study the Pareto optimal equilibria payoffs of the non-cooperative game associated with the cost spanning tree problem. We give two characterisations of these payoffs: one based on the tree they induce and another based on the strategies played by agents. Moreover, an algorithm for computing all these payoffs is provided. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: cost spanning tree problem; optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10479-005-2248-5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:137:y:2005:i:1:p:101-115:10.1007/s10479-005-2248-5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10479

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-005-2248-5

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros

More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().