Approximations and Well-Posedness in Multicriteria Games

Jacqueline Morgan

Annals of Operations Research, 2005, vol. 137, issue 1, 257-268

Abstract: First, sufficient conditions of minimal character are given which guarantee the sequential closedness of the set-valued function defined by the parametric weak-multicriteria Nash equilibria of a parametric multicriteria game, that is to say: a convergent sequence of parametric weak-multicriteria Nash equilibria, corresponding to an approximate value of the parameter x n , converges to a weak-multicriteria Nash equilibrium corresponding to the limit value x of the sequence (x n ) n . Then, approximating sequences and parametrically well-posedness for a multicriteria game are introduced and investigated. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: multicriteria non cooperative non-zero sum game; ɛ-weak-multicriteria Nash equilibria; parametrically well-posedness; approximating sequence; sequentially closed set-valued function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-005-2260-9

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