Entropic Penalties in Finite Games

S. Flåm () and E. Cavazzuti

Annals of Operations Research, 2005, vol. 137, issue 1, 348 pages

Abstract: The main objects here are finite-strategy games in which entropic terms are subtracted from the payoffs. After such subtraction each Nash equilibrium solves an explicit, unconstrained, nonlinear system of smooth equations. That system, while characteristic of perturbed best responses, is amenable in computation. It also facilitates analysis of fictitious play, learning by reinforcement, and evolutionary dynamics. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: finite games; Nash equilibrium; fictitious play; stimulus-response; gradient methods; evolutionary dynamics; entropy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-005-2264-5

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