Banzhaf Measures for Games with Several Levels of Approval in the Input and Output

Josep Freixas ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2005, vol. 137, issue 1, 45-66

Abstract: An axiomatic characterization of ‘a Banzhaf score’ notion is provided for a class of games called (j,k) simple games with a numeric measure associated to the output set, i.e., games with n players, j ordered qualitative alternatives in the input level and k possible ordered quantitative alternatives in the output. Three Banzhaf measures are also introduced which can be used to determine a player's ‘a priori’ value in such a game. We illustrate by means of several real world examples how to compute these measures. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: (j; k) simple games; abstention; several levels of approval; Banzhaf measures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10479-005-2244-9 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:137:y:2005:i:1:p:45-66:10.1007/s10479-005-2244-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10479

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-005-2244-9

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros

More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().