Combinatorial auctions

Jawad Abrache (), Teodor Crainic (), Michel Gendreau () and Monia Rekik ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2007, vol. 153, issue 1, 164 pages

Abstract: Combinatorial auctions are an important class of market mechanisms in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of multiple heterogeneous items. In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial auctions. These issues are related to the formulation of the winner determination problem, the expression of combined bids, the design of progressive combinatorial auctions that require less information revelation, and the need for decision support tools to help participants make profitable bidding decisions. For each issue, we survey the existing literature and propose avenues for further research. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: E-commerce; Mechanism design; Combinatorial auctions; Bidding languages; Iterative auctions; Advisors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-007-0179-z

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