Partially ordered cooperative games: extended core and Shapley value

J. Puerto (), F. Fernández () and Y. Hinojosa ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2008, vol. 158, issue 1, 143-159

Abstract: In this paper we analyze cooperative games whose characteristic function takes values in a partially ordered linear space. Thus, the classical solution concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined: the core concept, Shapley–Bondareva theorem and the Shapley value are extended for this class of games. The classes of standard, vector-valued and stochastic cooperative games among others are particular cases of this general theory. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Keywords: Cooperative games; Core; Shapley value; Partial order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-007-0242-9

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